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crisis also gave a push to the land reform movement in the newly liberated areas, particularly in the Southeast. After China entered the war, Mao issued orders to accelerate efforts along that vulnerable section of the coast in order to consolidate control and improve defense capabilities. 58 Perhaps most intriguing of all the domestic ramifications is the way the war intersected with the counterrevolutionary effort. Even before the war began, Beijing had regarded as urgent the suppression of remnant Nationalist forces on the mainland (estimated at 1.5 million in late 1949), spies and covert operations sponsored by Taibei and Washington, and banditry (perhaps as high as one million). These forces of disorder and anticommunist resistance, concentrated in southeast and southwest China, attacked local government officials and party cadres, blockaded or seized towns and villages, disrupted communications, carried out looting and robbery, committed sabotage and assassinations, and attacked scattered military units. As early as 1949, the People's Liberation Army had taken responsibility for dealing with the most serious of the resistance, and it carried its efforts to a conclusion in 1952 while also fighting in Korea.59
Beijing's determination to eliminate counterrevolutionary forces was reenforced by the fear that Nationalist forces, perhaps backed by the United States, might launch a counterattack on the mainland and link up with residual resistance groups, creating a rallying point against the CCP. This fear predated the Korean War and was intensified by the possibility (entertained by both Mao and Peng) of amphibious landings on the coast or an American march into the Northeast as the first step in an attempt at overthrowing the CCP.Y According to party sources, the American intervention in Korea and especially the Inchon landing were signals of hope for China's counterrevolutionaries. Active resistance groups, now joined by landlords, secret societies, and unemployed soldiers, thought that better times were just ahead and intensified their resistance. They carried out widely scattered acts of violence extending into the Northeast, the logistical base for Chinese forces in Korea, and stirred up rumors, while intimidating local party cadres. "You're like a frog in a well with no idea of the big picture and still in a mess. The third world war is coming and the Nationalist army will be right back."'"
The party center responded to this upsurge on 10 October with a directive calling for an end to a counterrevolutionary policy that had been too rightist in Perhaps the best overall characterization of this crisis is as a process of armed interrogation. With the two parties out of synch, the crisis was difficult to stabilize until each had realized through a painful exchange of blows and counterblows how wrong its initial estimate of the enemy's intentions and will had been. Given the ambiguity of perception on both sides, the complexity of the interaction, and the instability of policy all around, it is hard to imagine the crisis developing otherwise.
IMPLICATIONS OF KOREA FOR UNDERSTANDING CRISES
The characterization offered here of Sino-American interaction during the first year of the Korean War invites special attention to one major historical problem with important theoretical as well as political ramifications: the difficulty of imposing narrative order on a crisis and then extracting patterns and lessons from it. As the treatment above suggests, the task is challenging enough when dealing with just one set of policy makers, and it becomes considerably more daunting when dealing with two sets interacting with each other under intense pressure and with great rapidity.
Yet students of foreign policy crises have put a premium on imposing narrative order. This proclivity may be the result of the interpretive paradigm that they have operated within, one committed to engaging theory, evaluating the rationality of policy, and offering lessons to policy makers. The poverty of documentation on most of the crises studied and the tendency to focus on one side of a crisis (usually the better understood American role) rather than the international interplay has facilitated and reenforced this impulse to reduce crises to easily encapsulated and evaluated form.
Writings But is it possible that this string of studies goes too far in imposing order, whether for analytic neatness or national pride, and as a result fundamentally distorts our understanding of this crisis? Should we be more attuned to the element of chaos in decision making as one set of leaders formulates policy and to the element of contingency in the unfolding of crises as one set interacts with another? The reading of the Korean crisis outlined in the previous section of this article would suggest that the answer to both questions is yes. Misperception, miscalculation, and confusion were prominent, perhaps dominant features of the policy process on both sides. Beijing and Washington came to the crisis with attitudes that were ambivalent, even contradictory, and as each explored options ranging from inaction to all-out assault their views did not so much clarify as shift messily about.
These observations are not meant to deny rationality on the part of Chinese policy makers or for that matter on the part of Americans but to highlight the difficulty of applying the notion, especially in an international setting. It could be argued that policies within one capital, however diverse their sources, however jumbled their elements, however tentative their acceptance, however divergent their possible meanings, are nonetheless thought through by policy makers and thus can be subjected to the test of rationality within the prevailing political, cultural, and institutional framework. But when a crisis is viewed internationally and an analyst must deal with two or more historical actors each operating within strikingly different frameworks, then rationality as a standard of evaluation is much harder to apply. In this altered context we are more likely to be struck by the degree to which each party in a crisis is radically and necessarily hobbled by badly flawed or seriously incomplete information about the other. Even if the crisis environment were transparent, information does not necessarily assemble into a coherent and correct picture. And even if the available information is assembled into such a picture, a rapidly changing situation will soon leave it outdated.
Crisis studies need to temper their preoccupation with rationality by developing a greater sensitivity to policy makers' lack of clairvoyance, their cultural blinders, and their extreme vulnerability to contingency. These studies need to recognize in turn the degree to which this debilitating trio introduces a dynamic element to crisis as each side rushes to keep its estimate of the situation, the adequacy of its will and resources, and the nature of its overall goals current with the gyrations of equally agitated policy makers on the other side. Under stress the multiple, perhaps divergent goals of policy makers become exposed and the ambiguities of calculations are revealed. Viewed in international terms, crisis management such as is seen in Korea ceases to be a simple exercise in cool ends-means analysis (or a failure to match up to that standard) and becomes instead a kind of psychological St. Vitus dance that two rivals induce in each other and that ends only after exhaustion sets in.
If this characterization of crises as events enveloped in confusion and misinformation is correct, then historians and other students of this phenomenon are left to confront the paradox that they must speak clearly about something that is inherently disorderly and governed to a large degree by chance. By the same token, policy makers face the equally paradoxical situation. Robert McNamara's well known maxim that crises, so hard to manage, are simply best avoided sounds wise and prudent. But the Korean case suggests it is hard to act on in a world of fundamentally imperfect understanding.*
